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When Do Chinese National Ministries Make Law? 
Wei Cui, Peter A. Allard School of Law, 
University of British Columbia  
(October 10, 2019 draft)i 
Abstract: This paper documents some basic empirical facts about the issuance of formal regulations 
(FRs) and informal policy directives (IPDs) by China’s national ministries and agencies from 2000 to 2014. 
Prior scholarship (e.g. Cui 2011, Howson 2012) depicts specific instances of Chinese national agencies 
announcing substantive new policies (many ultra vires by statutory standards) through IPDs.  I use FR 
and IPD quantities as measures of the agencies’ propensity to resort to legal as opposed to non-legal, 
merely bureaucratic mechanisms for announcing policy. I find significant variations across agencies in 
the quantities of FRs issued, both in absolute terms and relative to the quantities of IPDs. The variations 
often contradict conventional perceptions about different agencies’ political orientations. Budget 
fluctuations do not predict FR or IPD issuance, nor do the minister’s tenure in office. Overall, formal 
rulemaking has been on the decline in China, accentuating the importance of the question:  Why do 
Chinese bureaucrats bother with rulemaking at all? I suggest a preliminary set of considerations relevant 
to answering this question. The study sheds new light on the different approaches taken by actors in the 
Chinese government to establishing basic “rule by law”. 
Keywords: Chinese law, rule by law, rule of law, rulemaking, informal policy documents, national 
ministries.   
Introduction 
Perhaps the most ubiquitous distinction in recent scholarship on Chinese law is drawn between 
“rule by law” and the “rule of law”. While individual usages differ, “rule by law” typically denotes an 
approach to governance that uses instruments and mechanisms that can be described as constituting a 
“legal system”, but which can essentially be tailored to the preferences of autocrats and used in state 
oppression, with disregard for citizens’ rights. Many refer to the same concept also by the term “thin” 
rule of law. Both terms are contrasted with the concept of “rule of law”, which reflects a deeper respect 
for due process and individual rights, and possibly additional norms associated with Western democratic 
institutions. Increasingly, scholars have come to assume that the Chinese government has embraced 
“rule by law” (in the mode of, say, Singapore), and focus their attention on the contrast between such a 
mode of “authoritarian legality” and the rule of law as traditionally understood in the West.  
I believe this widespread assumption is mistaken. “Rule by law” may be what the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) claims to want to implement, but does not accurately characterize many 
fundamental aspects of the Chinese state’s operation. The reach of legal institutions and processes in 
China—i.e. the presence of rule by law or “thin” rule of law—has been substantially overestimated in 
recent scholarship. Arguably, in taking the existence of basic legal ordering in China for granted, 
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scholars—even those who believe themselves to be highly critical of the Chinese government—have 
uncritically accepted much CCP discourse. This creates an intellectual conundrum; it does not seem 
conceptually possible to have the (thick) “rule of law” without the “thin” rule of law or rule by law. The 
focus on the distinction between the two seems unjustified when both are absent from Chinese 
governance.    
 
 Among the relatively few scholars who have commented on the fragility of even the “thin” rule 
of law in China is Professor Nico Howson. In his 2012 article “Enforcement without Foundation”,1 
Professor Howson identifies a 2007 China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) internal policy 
document on insider trading that is ultra vires relative to statutory provisions, patently invalid by 
Chinese administrative law standards, but that was nonetheless routinely enforced by CSRC and widely 
tolerated by affected investors in China’s capital markets. Professor Howson marvels at how “China's 
most ‘modern’, politically independent and technically competent regulator” could decide to impose 
such an egregiously defective rule, all with remarkably little resistance, “upon relatively sophisticated, 
well-educated, largely urban, property rights-wielding investors.” This seems especially surprising when 
“the regulated transactions are economic and financial, not political or oppositional in nature.” Such 
phenomena, he argues, “provide important insights regarding China's efforts to establish even thin ‘rule 
of law’ after more than three decades,” because they are emblematic of “a much larger dysfunction that 
exists in many other areas of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s applied legal and administrative law 
system.”2  
 
 Professor Howson conjectures that “the problem [that] appears under the administration of the 
CSRC…exist[s] even more in the approaches taken by older-line agencies and departments.” In this 
chapter, I test Professor Howson’s conjecture through a simple empirical exercise: I examine the 
promulgation of formal regulations (FRs) and publication of informal policy directives (IPDs) by all of 
China’s national ministries and agencies during the 2000-2013 period. Using the quantities of FRs and 
IPDs as a measure of agencies’ propensity to utilize legal as opposed to non-legal, merely bureaucratic 
policy instruments, I highlight some surprising patterns in the different approaches taken by a large 
range of actors in China’s central government to establishing basic “rule by law”.  
 
I find very significant variations in the quantities of formal regulations (which are genuine legal 
instruments) issued by different agencies, both in absolute number and relative to the quantities of IPDs 
published by the same agencies. These variations often contradict conventional perceptions about the 
political orientation of different agencies. For example, the Ministry of Public Security, an integral part of 
China’s machinery for state oppression that perhaps few would assume pursues the legitimacy of law, 
adopts formal regulations with greater relative frequency than most other ministries. Other patterns 
that emerge from the empirical analysis similarly lack ready explanations that can be drawn from the 
existing literature. I offer some preliminary hypotheses about how the patterns I identify may be 
explained. But the more general point is that the Chinese political class may have very limited incentives 
                                                 
1 Nico Howson, “Enforcement without Foundation?—Insider Trading and China's Administrative Law Crisis,” 
American Journal of Comparative Law 60(4) (2012): 955. 
2 Professor Howson persuasively argues that the illegality of the CSRC’s actions had little to do with what other 
commentators alleged to be China's "turn against law" in recent years. The CSRC policy guidance was non-
ideological and had “everything to do with how an expert agency actually applies the law and delegated power in a 
technically complex area way below the radar of public perception or macro-level political-legal discourse.” It was 
also “firmly rooted in long-held…and continuing understandings about the power and discretion afforded 
administrative actors in China, and the relationship of those institutions to law and legal institutions.” Id. at 994-5. 
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to pursue even “rule by law”, and that instead of taking the growth of legal ordering for granted, it is 
more appropriate to ask the question: Why do Chinese politicians bother with law at all?  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides basic background on China’s national level 
agencies and the distinction between formal regulations and informal policy directives. In particular, I 
draw a sharper distinction between what is law and what is not law in the Chinese system than 
Professor Howson does, and elaborate on why doing so is justified. Section 2 sets out certain basic 
patterns in agency rulemaking. Section 3 discusses potential explanations of the patterns identified in 
Section 2, and presents further related empirical analyses. Section 4 sets out a preliminary framework 
for understanding Chinese politicians’ incentives for lawmaking and discusses some implications of the 
chapter’s empirical findings.  
1. Can Ministries Make Law other than Regulations?  
 
I propose to assess Chinese national government agencies’ propensity to establish “rule by law” 
by measuring their frequency of issuing formal regulations (bumen guizhang) relative to their issuance 
of informal policy directives. Since the enactment of the Law on Legislation (LL) in 2000, clear 
procedures have generally governed the adoption and publication of ministry/agency regulations. A 
ministry regulation is always issued as a decree (ling) in the name of the minister, and is published with 
consecutive numbering. Consistent with the principle that law must be published to take effect, it is rare 
for a ministry regulation associated with a known decree number to not be locatable. By contrast, 
Chinese executive branch agencies issue a wide variety of bureaucratic documents, and there is no 
uniform format for those documents intended to have policy significance, and no guarantee that those 
documents with policy significance would be publicly available.  
 
Take the CSRC for example. The 2007 insider trading guidance that Professor Howson criticizes 
has the document numbering “zhengjian jicha zi (2007) No. 1”. In the same year, the CSRC issued 13 
regulations by itself (CSRC Decrees no. 40 to 52) and 4 joint regulations with other ministries. As of July 
2019, Chinalawinfo also lists 62 CSRC ministry policy documents (bumen guifanxing wenjian) from 2007, 
along with 626 CSRC “ministry work documents” (bumen gongzuo wenjian) and 1,042 CSRC decisions 
made with respect to individual persons from the same year. While the insider trading guidance is 
classified by Chinalawinfo as a policy document, no other document in the jicha zi series is available for 
2007. This could be either because there was no further document in the series,3 or because further 
documents in the series were not released to the public. Moreover, given that the jicha zi series 
concerns audits, one might have expected documents in the series to relate to the enforcement of 
already-announced policies, instead of announcing policies for the first time. In other words, 
Chinalawinfo’s classification of the guidance as a CSRC policy document did not have any particular legal 
basis; it seems that the guidance could easily have been treated as a “work document” (a category of 
Chinalawinfo’s own creation).4    
 
The difficulty of identifying bureaucratic documents that are not formal regulations and are 
intended to be generally complied with is much more pervasive than the single example of the insider 
trading guidance might suggest. For instance, in 2007 the CSRC appears to have issued at least 144 
                                                 
3 This seems somewhat unlikely, given that the jichazi series is presumably tied to the Audit Bureau and possibly 
even the Audit Taskforce (jicha zongdui) of the CSRC. 
4 Professor Howson argued against viewing the insider trading guidance as guifanxing wenjian. Howson, supra note 
1, at 979-80. 
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circulars (zhengjianfa) in its own name. As of 2019, only ten of these are available as policy documents 
on Chinalawinfo; seven others are available as work documents (and none as individual decisions), 
leaving most documents in the zhengjianfa series unaccounted for. The CSRC also issues other 
documents on behalf of its various divisions, e.g. the jigouzi series for the Institutional Division, the 
faxingzi series for the Listing Division, and so on. Plenty of documents in each of the multiple series 
remain unpublished. The published documents in each series are used variously for announcing policies, 
organizing bureaucratic matters within the agency, or rendering individual decisions. There is generally 
neither a legal nor institutional basis for knowing which documents are intended to promulgate policy.5  
 
Finally, it should be noted that in the last decade, the CSRC appears to increasingly issue policy 
documents in the consecutively-numbered bulletin (gonggao) format. This practice bears some 
similarity to the practices of a few other national agencies (e.g. the State Administration of Taxation or 
SAT6) that aim to improve the procedure for agency policy adoption outside formal rulemaking, and to 
make it easier for the public to follow policy announcements. However, it remains unclear whether the 
CSRC currently issues major policy announcements only through bulletins, and if not, what other 
methods exist to identify such announcements.  
 
  In summary, if we stipulate that guifanxing wenjian—which I translate in the remainder of this 
chapter as “informal policy directives” (IPDs)—refer to government documents that are not formal 
regulations but that nonetheless announce policies intended to be generally followed by the public, 
then what is an IPD at the CSRC remains unclear to this day. To our knowledge, this ambiguity applies to 
virtually all Chinese executive branch entities, at national and subnational levels. Indeed, few agencies 
have adopted the CSRC and SAT practices of identifying IPDs through a specific document format (e.g. a 
consecutively-numbered bulletin). 
 
I believe that these observations imply, at a basic conceptual level, that IPDs issued by Chinese 
government agencies should not be viewed as generating legal norms. Stated in legal theoretical terms, 
legal norms come into being only when there are accepted “rules of recognition”—used by either 
government officials, or the public to whom legal norms apply, or both—to identify which rules are 
legally valid.7 Legal norms must display certain “attributes of legality,” so that it is possible for it to 
become common knowledge in the relevant community which norms embody the demands of law.8 The 
example of the CSRC shows that when one puts ministry regulations (and higher norms such as national 
statutes) aside, Chinese national agencies have not offered alternative mechanisms for identifying 
sources of norms that civil servants and citizens must comply with and enforce. Therefore, in a non-
legalistic sense that should be recognizable in diverse legal systems, Chinese ministry IPDs do not 
constitute “law”.9  
                                                 
5 For example, Chinalawinfo classifies a no-action letter issued to Dongfang Electric (zhengjian gongsizi [2007]191) 
as a guifanxing wenjian, while other similar no-action letters are treated as either work documents or individual 
decisions.  
6 The SAT began the practice of announcing policy through bulletins in 2010. See Wei Cui, “What Is the “Law” in 
Chinese Tax Administration?” Asia Pacific Law Review 19(1) (2011): 75. 
7 See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Scott J. Shapiro, Legality 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2013). 
8 See Gillian K. Hadfield, and Barry R. Weingast, “Microfoundations of the Rule of Law,” Annual Review of Political 
Science 17 (2014): 21. 
9 Professor Howson refrains from drawing this conclusion (Howson, supra note 1, at 987-8), but I believe the 




This conclusion is—or at least would have been until recently—even more straightforward when 
analyzed in Chinese legal terms. The Law on Legislation (LL) prescribes clear norms and procedures for 
enacting law (including executive branch regulations) and does not contemplate any source of generally 
applicable norms in the Chinese legal system aside from those stated in its scope. The LL arguably offers 
the most salient set of “rules of recognition” within the Chinese legal system, which rules command 
wide compliance among government officials.10 There is no comparable set of alternative rules of 
recognition anywhere else in the Chinese legal system. This set of rules of recognition was also until 
recently clearly upheld by the judicial system. Under the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL), Chinese 
judges must refer to (canzhao) ministry regulations as sources of law and must apply them if they are 
not in conflict with higher legal norms. On the other hand, at least prior to 2018, Chinese judges could 
choose to apply or disregard IPDs at their discretion.11   
 
The recent change to the “rules of recognition” in the Chinese legal system just alluded to does 
not affect Professor Howson’s 2007 CSRC example nor the empirical analysis below; it is a change that is 
still unknown to much of the world. Since 2015, when the ALL was amended, plaintiffs suing 
government agencies in China have been entitled to request courts to pass judgements on the legal 
validity of any IPDs that defendant agencies purport to be the basis of their actions. I have argued 
elsewhere that this measure for judicial review of IPDs, which would ostensibly empower plaintiffs, is 
not only largely unnecessary but also will likely prove counterproductive. This is because of the glaring 
ambiguity as to how much China’s civil law judiciary can compel agencies in the executive branch to 
explicitly revise or withdraw their IPDs. Moreover, in 2018, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued an 
interpretation of the amended ALL, which instructed judges to give IPDs legal effect whenever they are 
determined to not contravene higher legal norms. In other words, whereas the previous standard of 
judicial review of IPDs is that IPDs may be given effect if judges deem them to be reasonable and not 
ultra vires (or otherwise invalid), the new standard is that IPDs must be given legal effect if they are not 
invalid (even if unreasonable).  
 
This seems to amount to a requirement of greater judicial deference to the executive than 
under the previous status quo. It further implies that IPDs may be regarded as a source of legal norms, 
as long as they are not patently illegal. This is because executive branch agencies can now argue that, in 
the absence of patent illegality, their IPDs would always be given effect by courts per the SPC’s 
instruction. It remains to be seen how the SPC’s new ALL interpretation will be followed. It does not 
resolve the question of how to identify IPDs generally, since the vast majority of IPDs will not be 
litigated. However, it does threaten to introduce a new path to “legality” for IPDS completely alien to 
the Law on Legislation.    
 
In any case, I study the practices of national ministries in adopting formal regulations and issuing 
IPDs in an earlier period, during which FRs, based on the foregoing arguments, were the only forms of 
law promulgated by ministries.12 The issuance of FRs and IPDs by national ministries put an important 
                                                 
10 That is, few Chinese government officials, and least of all government lawyers and judges, would fail to 
distinguish between regulations and IPDs, even though many laypersons and legal scholars do.  
11 Cui, supra note 6; Wei Cui, Jie Cheng and Dominika Weisner, “Judicial Review of Government Actions,” China 
Perspectives 1 (2019): 29.  
12 I do not analyze the State Council’s promulgation of formal regulations and IPDs, since the unique status of the 
State Council makes it hard to compare with other executive branch entities.  
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bound on the overall supply of rules and policies in China. Although provincial and sub-provincial 
governments also issue FRs and IPDs,13 they face numerous constraints in and disincentives for doing so 
(particularly the veto or disapproval of higher-level policymakers). National-level rulemaking, by 
contrast, faces the lowest risk of interference by other principals, while also benefitting the most from 
economies of scale. Therefore, for any regulatory issue for which a nationally consistent set of rules is 
feasible, the adoption of such rules by the national government is the most desirable.14  
 
During the period I study, Chinese national ministries were officially divided into six types:15  
(A) 25 cabinet ministries;  
(B) 16 agencies directly affiliated with the State Council, 9 of which are full ministry-level 
agencies;16  
(C) 13 “non-administrative” agencies directly affiliated with the State Council, three of which—
agencies regulating banking, insurance, and securities—perform functions important to the 
administrative state (notwithstanding their classification);17  
(D) 16 national bureaus reporting to other national agencies, all of which are ranked one tier 
lower than agencies in categories (A) to (C), though some of them also play important 
regulatory functions;  
(E) 4 clerical offices of the State Council; and  
(F) 30 temporary inter-agency coordination offices.  
 
In 2015 and 2016, I gathered FR and IPD data for most agencies within groups (A) to (D) except 
for the non-regulatory agencies in category (C).18 I have ignored agencies in groups (E) to (F). A table of 
ministries/agencies, as well as information regarding data on additional ministry-level variables used in 
the analyses below, are given in Table A.1 in the (online) Appendix. 
2. Overview of Ministry Regulations and IPD Issuance, 2000-2014 
 
 Figure 1 depicts the overall trends in ministry regulation-making and IPD release. The dramatic 
rise in the volume of publicly available IPDs is not surprising; open government information initiatives 
individually pursued by various ministries prior to 2008, and made mandatory by the State Council in 
2008, are likely responsible for the increases of IPDs in the public domain. Perhaps more remarkable is 
the decline in formal rulemaking since the mid-2000s; collectively, Chinese national agencies in recent 
years make only about half of the number of regulations that they did in 2004. The ‘per ministry’ mean 
of FR issuance is 65 over the fifteen-year period and the median is 54, both converting to around four 
                                                 
13 For a systematic study, see Wei Cui and Jiang Wan, “When Do Chinese Subnational Governments Make Law?” 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3467703.  
14 In terms of data, national ministries also enjoy economies of scale in publicizing the rules they adopt, and 
therefore any rule that is meant to be published and to be of common knowledge is also most likely to be 
published. 
15 See http://www.gov.cn/gjjg/2005-08/01/content_18608.htm.  
16 These tend to be agencies that began as minor agencies but evolved and acquired important status—the 
General Administration of Customs, the State Administration of Taxation, and the State Administration for Industry 
and Commerce are examples. 
17 Others in this group are quite different in character, and include, for example, Xinhua News Agency and the 
Academy of Science. I exclude these non-regulatory agencies from the scope of the study. 
18 The timing of the data gathering matters for IPDs, as more IPDs are released and included in databases over 




regulations per ministry per year. For IPD, the mean and median per year per ministry are 183 and 66, 




Table 1 ranks ministries by FR adoption during this period and provides the corresponding mean 
annual IPD frequency for each ministry.19 Consider first the end of the spectrum characterized by 
infrequent regulation making. The ministries of National Defense and of State Security issued not a 
single FR over the 15-year period, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued only one. Notably, Defense 
also released to the public only two IPDs during the entire period and State Security released 12, while 
MFA released on average only seven IPDs per year. One explanation of these striking numbers for these 
three large, cabinet-level ministries might be their lack of transparency.20 Supporting this interpretation 
is the observation that, while the National Oceans Administration and the (former) National 
Administration of Survey and Geography also adopted very few regulations (one and three for the whole 
period, respectively), they are more forthcoming in releasing IPDs (averaging respectively 29 and 68 per 
year). Specialized jurisdictional scope and smaller regulated populations, rather than secretiveness, 
seem the more plausible explanation of the low frequency of rulemaking in these latter ministries.  
 
At the other end of spectrum, characterized by (relatively) high frequencies of regulation 
making, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) leads with an average of sixteen regulations a year. It 
might be suggested that MOFCOM’s status as the agency most closely associated with China’s accession 
                                                 
19 Omitted for reasons of space are numerous category D agencies that displayed zero FR adoption but either 
sizeable or at least not extremely low IPD issuance (total IPD issuance in parentheses): State Post Bureau (153), 
National Energy Administration (289), Tobacco Monopoly Administration (346), State Administration of Coal Mine 
Safety (721), State Administration of Grain (796), State Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine (994), and 
State Administration of Cultural Heritage (6,293). 
20 Several category D agencies also showed extremely low IPD counts: the State Administration of Science, 
Technology and Industry for National Defense, State Bureau of Civil Servants, and State Bureau for Letters and 
Calls (each released fewer than two IPDs on average per year). It is reasonable to regard these agencies as 
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Figure 1: Aggregate FR Adoption and IPD 




to the WTO makes it most sensitive to the WTO’s government transparency requirements. For those 
tempted by this explanation of MOFCOM’s frequent formal rulemaking,21 it will be disappointing that it 
would not work for the other agencies at the top of the chart (the Ministry of Transport, General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Ministry of Agriculture, General Administration of Customs, and 
so on). Furthermore, for anyone inclined to explain the CSRC’s relative high rank by the modern outlook 
of its staff, the even higher rank of the National Development and Reform Commission should give 
pause.  
 
Another way to assess the propensity for formal rulemaking is to look at the frequency of 
regulation making relative to IPD issuance. The idea is that if the volume of IPDs is a function of an 
agency’s scope of regulatory responsibility, then the FR to IPD ratio would render ministries’ observed 
dispositions towards “rule by law” more comparable. This idea is partially validated empirically. Through 
single-factor ANOVA analysis I determined that there is no significant difference among agency 
categories (A) to (D) in respect of mean annual FRs, nor with respect to the FR to IPD ratio (calculated on 
a 14-year aggregate basis). However, with respect to mean number of IPDs issued, category (A) agencies 
generated more IPDs than category (B) agencies, which in turn generated more than category (D) 
agencies.22 It seems plausible to attribute these differences to the average political status of agencies 
among the three groups. The FR to IPD ratio would render the agencies in the different groups more 
comparable.  
 
It must be acknowledged, however, that the available data on IPDs is quite noisy for two basic 
reasons. First, the volume of IPDs clearly depends on the transparency of the agency; an agency that 
lacks transparency will have lower IPD counts than an agency of the same size or importance that is 
more transparent. Second, as discussed in Section 1, what constitutes an IPD is unclear, and one must 
rely on the judgements of Chinalawinfo’s classifiers (which may change over time) for measuring IPD 
quantity. In further analysis discussed in Section 3, budget and staff information are used as alternative 
measures of agency size/importance. In the absence of more accurate measures of agency regulatory 
responsibility, one can do no more than to exclude some outliers that appear to suffer the above 
problems most severely. Specifically, in the ranking below I exclude State Security, Defense, Supervision, 
Foreign Affairs, the Bureau of Statistics, the Audit Bureau, and the National Civil Aviation Administration 
based on their low IPD counts, and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission because of its extremely 
high IPD count (probably due to Chinalawinfo’s classification).23   
 
 Figure 2 displays the resulting ranking. I emphasize that the aim of the ranking is to highlight 
certain patterns of potential interest: for the reasons given above, the ranking cannot be taken as 
definitive. The first thing to note is the significant variation across agencies (which is also observed in 
terms of the absolute quantities of FRs). Among cabinet ministries, the Ministry of Transport has an FR 
to IPD ratio ten times as high as the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Finance. Among ministry-
level bureaus, Industry and Commerce has an FR to IPD ratio six times higher than the State 
Administration of Taxation. Second, even after omitting many zero or near zero FR adopters, the median 
FR to IPD ratio (instantiated by the NDRC) is relatively low, with 40 IPDs for each FR. Third, the ranking is, 
I would suggest, not easy to rationalize based on conventional wisdom. For instance, the Chinese police 
                                                 
21 Anecdotes also suggest that MOFCOM has the largest legal department among all national-level agencies.   
22 I leave out category (C) agencies in the ANOVA analysis because the only agencies in this group I examine are the 
three financial regulators, and the CIRC is a clear outlier in IPD output.  
23 Further, all category D agencies with zero FR adoption are also omitted.  
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(Public Security) seems far more likely to pursue rulemaking than the People’s Bank of China. It is a 




3. Potential Explanations of the Diverse Approaches to Rule by Law 
 
a. Policy Topic and Institutions of Enforcement  
 
A clue to an explanation for (at least some of) the patterns in Figure 2 (and Table 1) is furnished 
by a study of subnational lawmaking I carried out with a co-author.24 In that study, we gathered 
comprehensive information for the period of 2000 to 2014 regarding the local statutes (LSs) enacted by 
China’s 31 provinces and 49 of its cities that had lawmaking power before 2015, as well as the FRs and 
IPDs issued by the People’s Governments in the same jurisdictions. We further classified all LSs, FRs, and 
IPDs into 39 policy subjects. These subjects do not perfectly correspond to the assortment of line 
agencies at the subnational levels,25 but there is a reasonable amount of overlap. After applying this 
classification to over 184,000 policy instruments (!), we computed, for each governmental unit, policy 
subject and type of policy instrument (LS, FR, or IPD), the proportion of that type of instrument devoted 
to the subject. For each subject, we then computed (i) the excess of the proportion of LSs devoted to it 
over the proportion of IPDs devoted to it in a given jurisdiction, and (ii) a similar excess of FRs over IPDs. 
When both (i) and (ii) are positive for a subject, we take this as an indication that for the jurisdiction in 
question, there is a preference (relative to other policy topics) to announce policy on the subject 
through lawmaking. Conversely, when both (i) and (ii) are negative for a given subject, we take this as 
indication of a relative preference for informal policy announcement.   
 
                                                 
24 Cui and Wan, supra note 13.  
25 This was partly because at the subnational level, only the chief executive office (i.e. governors or mayors) can 
enact FRs, while line agencies did not have their own power to make law, unlike national agencies. Thus we 




























































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Ranking of Select Agencies by FR/IPD Ratio
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Certain consistent biases towards formal lawmaking or informal policy announcements in most 
provinces and cities emerge from this analysis. Among the subjects for which informality seems to 
dominate are (i) tax and public finance, and (ii) education. These correspond to three of the lowest-
ranked ministries in Figure 2. Other subjects for which informality seems to dominate are economic 
development, medical and healthcare, social security, and food and drugs regulation. By contrast, in 
numerous policy areas, including transportation and public safety, a relative preference for lawmaking is 
found in most provinces and cities. Other similar areas are regulation of markets, environmental 
regulation, population and marriage, and construction and real estate. Figure 3 illustrates the patterns 
for some of these subjects.  
 
We proposed to explain these biases towards formality or informality in the following way. For 
some subjects, there may be a strong need for the relevant policies to become public and common 
knowledge. For instance, enforcement by government agents alone may not suffice for rules on public 
safety, transportation, environmental protection, construction and real estate, or regulation of markets 
generally. Parties outside of the government are crucial to monitoring compliance, but they must know 
what the rules are to perform such monitoring. Arguably, therefore, these policy areas are inherently 
“public facing”. The promulgation of policies in these spheres through formal procedures has the unique 
ability to provide the publicity that the rules are likely to require, while IPDs, though much less costly to 
promulgate, would not allow for similar benefits.  
 
In contrast, in policy topics dominated by informality, we observe either of two institutional 
arrangements. One is the presence of public ownership, as reflected in education and healthcare (and 
therefore also drugs). The other is the involvement of bureaucratic internal coordination; policies to 
promote economic development are a key example. Tax, public finance, and social security in China are 
policy areas that combine features of both arrangements. In both settings, policies matter more to 
bureaucrats and public employees than to the wide public; therefore broad social compliance is less of 
an issue. Therefore, regardless of who adopts these rules—provinces or cities—informal 
implementation carries no disadvantage. 
 
The validity of these explanations, in my view, gains support from the ministerial patterns in 
Table 1 and Figure 2. Surely it is striking that the subjects of tax, public finance, and education lend 
themselves strongly to informal policy announcement consistently at the national, provincial, and city 
levels, while lawmakers at all three levels show a relative preference for formality on the subjects of 
transportation and public safety. It is worth noting that this explanation implies that whether the use of 
law is necessary (or dispensable) depends on prior institutional choices. For instance, tax policy can be 
public facing, if we assume that tax collection relies on taxpayers to learn what the law is and declare 
their tax liabilities accordingly (subject to the threat of audits and penalties). That, precisely, is how we 
tend to think about tax administration in many developed countries (tax compliance is rule-following par 
excellence). In China, however, tax collection very much relies on the effort of frontline tax collectors to 
coerce and cajole taxpayers, with the result that taxpayer knowledge of tax law is far less important.26 
Conversely, one can imagine that if the transportation sector in China were (counterfactually) largely 
state-owned, as schools and hospitals are, the need for lawmaking in promulgating transportation policy 
would decrease substantially.      
 
                                                 
26 See Wei Cui, “Administrative Decentralization and Tax Compliance: A Transactional Cost Perspective,” University 
of Toronto Law Journal 65(3) (2015): 186. 
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b. Ministerial characteristics  
 
Are there other ministerial characteristics, aside from policy area, that might explain the 
quantities of FRs (and IPDs) they generate?27 The only independent variables I am able to gather data for 
at the ministry level are the staff size, budgets (both proposed and actual), and the identities of ministry 
or agency chiefs (for all years) for some ministries.28 Figure 4 visualizes the correlations of numbers of 
FRs and of IPDs to the budget variables. The size of the ministry budget has no impact on FR output, and 
once agency and year fixed effects are controlled for, similarly has no impact on the quantity of IPDs.29  
Figure 5 shows that there is a raw positive correlation between staff size and both FR and IPD output, 
and that this correlation remains even after controlling for average budget. It is quite likely, however, for 
some other ministry characteristic to jointly explain staff size and the volumes of FRs and IPDs produced, 
reducing the plausibility of any causal relationship.30  
 
These results are not altogether surprising. Much Chinese government staffing is concentrated 
at sub-provincial levels, and ministerial staff size often fails to reflect the jurisdictional scope of a 
national agency.31 The nature of ministerial budgets is also not well understood. Both might be noisy 
measures of agencies’ regulatory responsibility.  
 
c. Politician Incentives  
 
In both China and the U.S.,32 often the most well-known and closely observed aspect of 
government agencies besides their policy announcements is their political leaders. In recent years, 
political scientists studying China have offered a variety of evidence showing that China’s subnational 
politicians are strongly motivated by certain implicit performance metrics and political career incentives. 
None of the studies, however, examines ministerial-level political leaders. It is, of course, a good 
question how the performance of ministry chiefs in China can be evaluated—virtually none of the 
targets set for subnational politicians (e.g. GDP growth, social stability, birth control, etc.) is applicable 
to national ministries. There are at least two possible answers. One is that ministers are evaluated on 
the implementation of policies that hold priority for more senior politicians; these may be reflected in 
ministerial policy announcements. The other is that policy implementation mostly occurs at the 
subnational level and thus requires much coordination from subnational actors, such that it is difficult to 
specify a ministerial-level outcome that would be appropriate for evaluation.    
 
                                                 
27 Analysis not shown here confirms that once agency and year fixed effects are controlled for, there is no 
significant correlation between FRs and IPDs. 
28 Data on staff size tends to be available only for one year per ministry, thus form only a cross section (with 39 
observations). However, staffing level tended also to experience little change at the national ministries in the 
period we cover. The budget data formed a panel with a maximum of 113 ministry-years. See Appendix Table A.1 
for data availability by ministry. 
29 Figure 4 uses data on proposed budgets. The results from closing budgets are similar.  
30 Because we only have cross sectional data on staff size, we cannot control for year fixed effects.  
31 The SAT, for example, has a staff of fewer than 800 but nominally supervises close to 800,000 tax administrators 
across China, which represents more than 10% of the civil service. The Ministry of Environmental Protection 
similarly hosts only 0.7% of the total staff employed by environmental protection agencies in China.  
32 For a recent empirical study of U.S. federal government rulemaking, see Rachel Potter and Charles Shipan, 
“Agency rulemaking in a separation of powers system,” Journal of Public Policy 39(1) (2019): 89. 
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Figure 6 displays regressions where the dependent variable is the FR (or IPD) count of a ministry 
in a given year, and the independent variable is the year-in-office of the minister, along with agency and 
year fixed effects. Two different specifications (Poisson and negative binomial, both used to deal with 
the low-count nature of the FR variable) are used. What we see is clearly a null result: except for a slight 
loss in productivity for ministers occupying their offices for eight years or more, career progress has no 
observed impact on FR or IPD production. This is consistent with the fact that (to my knowledge) making 
regulations per se is not one of the performance metrics applied to political leaders in the executive 
branch, and issuing IPDs is sufficiently low-cost to most bureaucrats that it could not possibly be used as 
a performance metric.  
4. The Calculus of Lawmaking  
 
Studying patterns in and explanations for agency rulemaking behavior is challenging in any 
context,33 but I believe it is crucially important in the Chinese setting, for the following reason. Chinese 
government agencies do make law, but as Professor Howson’s CSRC example and so many other similar 
examples demonstrate, they could just as easily—or, indeed, much more easily—not make law. 
Commands directed at bureaucratic subordinates, including in the form of IPDs, prevail. Much recent 
scholarship on Chinese law has endeavored to argue that authoritarianism may be consistent with “rule 
by law”, even if it is in conflict with a stronger notion of “rule of law”.34 But the very infrequency with 
which Chinese bureaucratic leaders resort to law shows that even if “rule by law” is consistent with 
authoritarianism, it is far from the preferred approach to governance. To understand Chinese 
governance today and in the foreseeable future, one must understand the autocrats’ alternatives to 
law—alternatives that have not only survived 40 years of economic reform but have likely grown with 
the economy.35    
 
We can frame the issue in the following way. A minister of a national agency can choose among 
several different paths for implementing new policies. He can propose to the Prime Minister that the 
latter enact either statutes (through the National People’s Congress), administrative statutes (xingzheng 
fagui), or some State Council informal directive. Or he can promulgate a formal regulation (if not 
preempted by higher law), which also possesses formal legal effect and is binding on courts, without 
elevating the issue politically. Alternatively, he can eschew formalities altogether, and implement policy 
through issuing IPDs. It would seem which path he pursues should depend on their relative benefits and 
costs. In particular, putting aside the options related to the State Council (outside the scope of this 
study), what relative benefits and costs do FRs possess when compared with IPDs?  
 
The attractions of IPDs seem overwhelming. Informal directives are much less costly to produce 
in terms of both time and political resources, making them the perfect instruments for achieving short-
term policy objectives. They are also flexible, and can be easily revised to incorporate new information 
and to correct mistakes in past policies. Moreover, they can be used to express the wills and preferences 
of a few political actors without garnering the consensus of a broad array of stakeholders. Finally, 
although IPDs may not command consensus among political actors, they are generally backed by the 
                                                 
33 For reviews of the (mixed) results in empirical analyses of federal rulemaking in the U.S., see Potter and Shipan, 
supra note 32; John de Figueiredo, J. M., and E. Stiglitz, “Democratic Rulemaking,” in Oxford Handbook of Law and 
Economics: Volume 3: Public Law and Legal Institutions, ed. Francesco Parisi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017), chapter 3. 
34 To some, this may seem like a platitude; to others, “rule by law” and “rule of law” are not so easily distinguished. 
35 See the declining trend in rulemaking in Figure 1.  
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coercive power of the state and few private actors will succeed in contesting them merely because they 
lack formal legal effect. Even if IPDs cannot bind courts, this fact in itself is unlikely to undermine a 
policy’s implementability in China.  
 
In what circumstances, then, might a minister view a formal regulation as a superior path of for 
the pursuit of policy? I propose four such reasons.  
 
First, because of the existence of procedural rules, the adoption of a formal statute or regulation 
is more time-consuming—and, by the same token, so is its repeal. That is, formal legal rules are 
generally more permanent, whereas IPDs are easily reversed. The adoption of formal legal rules can thus 
insulate policies from changes in political coalitions or configurations in special interest groups.  
 
Second, the procedures for adopting formal legal rules also imply that there is a process for 
achieving policy consensus and political coordination within the ministry. For example, if a single 
ministry division is capable of implementing a policy without opposition from other division, it may be 
sufficient for the division to sponsor its own IPDs. However, if coordination among multiple divisions is 
necessary or desired, making formal legal rules is one important way of achieving such coordination. 
Indeed, the relative permanence of formal legal rules ensures that such coordination can be relied on 
and does not easily unravel.   
 
Third, the higher legal status of formal legal rules may lead to greater compliance by 
government actors (e.g. different government offices). This is the case not because of enforceability by 
courts, but by virtue of bureaucratic and Party disciplinary rules. That is, formal legal norms can be used 
by the superior or more powerful members of the political hierarchy to discipline subordinate or less 
powerful members. The vulnerability of those who take actions in breach of the law comes not from the 
threat of judicial repudiation and any consequent undermining of the implementation of the policies, 
but from political rivals who may highlight such a breach in political contests. 
 
Fourth and finally, whereas the large quantities of informal agency announcements and their 
most frequent use in managing mundane government activities ensure that any given IPD is likely to 
remain obscure to the public, formality provides the rules with prominence, legitimacy, and authority. It 
is possible that ministerial political leaders have personal preferences for these “attributes of legality”, 
but it is more likely that the functional role of these attributes in securing compliance exerts a steady, 
even if not inexorable, pull on bureaucratic choices. This logic may be what is at play in the consistent 
biases towards formality in certain policy areas discussed in Section 3.1.   
 
It is surely an empirical challenge to find ways to ascertain the presence of any of these four 
circumstances. My own intuition is that reasons two and three have infrequent application in the 
ministry context. Different divisions within a ministry do not represent factions with firmly demarcated 
turfs in the same way that different ministries or line agencies do, so the cost of ongoing inter-division 
coordination is unlikely to justify investing in rulemaking. Moreover, if we think that the important 
political rivalries occur across ministries instead of within, the formal regulation of one ministry is 
unlikely to intimidate rivals in a different ministry. This leaves reasons one and four as the main 
incentives for and benefits of ministry regulation-making. 
 
These preliminary conjectures deserve further investigation, by both legal scholars and political 
scientists. I close this chapter with a comment on one strand of recent political science scholarship on 
China’s bureaucracy. There appears to be substantial interest in studying open policy consultations 
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hosted by the executive branch entities. It is as though scholars are eager to extend their studies of 
public deliberation in the parliamentary branch of government in China to the executive branch. I have 
argued elsewhere against the fixation on parliamentary deliberation; in a parliamentary system firmly 
controlled by one party, one would simply not expect much parliamentary deliberation even in a 
democracy.36 Here, I would strongly caution against fixation on deliberation in the executive branch as 
well. Public consultations are generally required for the making of ministry regulations,37 and as far as I 
can tell, the public consultation processes pursued by national ministries and studied by scholars 
predominantly involve regulation-making. That is, engagement in public consultation is entirely a 
parasitic epiphenomenon of the decision to engage in formal rulemaking. Thus, any study purporting to 
address the question of when (and which) Chinese ministries pursue public consultations must 
necessarily yield to the study of the more fundamental question posed in this chapter: When do Chinese 
national ministries make law?   
                                                 
36 Wei Cui and Jiang Wan, “Decentralizing Legislation in China’s Law on Legislation Amendment,” Hong Kong Law 
Journal 49(2) (2019). 
37 Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Rules (规章制定程序条例) (Promulgated by the State Council 
on November 16, 2001; revised on December 22, 2017), Article 15.  
Table 1: National Ministries’ Formal Regulations and Released IPDs (2000-2014) 
 








Ministry of Commerce 15 417 Human Resources and Social Security 3 189 
Ministry of Transport 13 181 People's Bank of China 3 224 
General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine 
12 408 Ministry of Culture 2 320 
Ministry of Agriculture 10 452 State Taxation Administration 2 347 
General Administration of Customs 9 155 State Food and Drug Administration 2 190 
Civil Aviation Administration of China 9 16 State Forestry Administration 2 69 
National Development and Reform Commission 9 317 Ministry of Water Resources 2 76 
China Securities Regulatory Commission 8 259 Ministry of Civil Affairs 2 117 
Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development 7 455 National Railway Administration 2 64 
State Administration of Work Safety 6 146 State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission  
2 59 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 6 217 National Tourism Bureau 2 40 
Ministry of Public Security 6 82 Ministry of Education 2 474 
China Insurance Regulatory Commission 5 791 Ministry of Supervision 2 11 
National Health Commission 5 236 General Administration of Sport 1 78 
State Administration for Industry and Commerce 5 116 Ministry of Science and Technology 1 91 
Ministry of Justice 5 62 National Bureau of Statistics 1 17 
Ministry of Environmental Protection 5 256 National Audit Office 1 24 
China Banking Regulatory Commission 5 428 State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange 
1 67 
State Administration of Radio, Film and Television 4 52 National Administration of Surveying, 
Mapping and Geoinformation 
0 68 
Ministry of Finance 4 617 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 0 7 
State Intellectual Property Office 4 35 State Oceanic Administration 0 29 
General Administration of Press and Publication 4 57 Ministry of National Defense 0 0 
Ministry of Land and Resources 4 105 Ministry of State Security 0 1 
   Average across ministries 4 183 
 
Data source: Chinalawinfo, IPD information gathered in December 2015.  













-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 6 negatives ( 12.24% ) and 19 positives ( 38.78% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 2 negatives (  6.45% ) and 21 positives ( 67.74% ).













-.05 0 .05 .1 .15
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 2 negatives (  4.08% ) and 28 positives ( 57.14% ).














-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 13 negatives ( 26.53% ) and 16 positives ( 32.65% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 5 negatives ( 16.13% ) and 18 positives ( 58.06% ).













-.05 0 .05 .1 .15 .2
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 5 negatives ( 10.20% ) and 26 positives ( 53.06% ).














-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 7 negatives ( 14.29% ) and 26 positives ( 53.06% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 7 negatives ( 22.58% ) and 15 positives ( 48.39% ).











-.05 0 .05 .1 .15
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 4 negatives (  8.16% ) and 40 positives ( 81.63% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 5 negatives ( 16.13% ) and 15 positives ( 48.39% ).













-.08 -.06 -.04 -.02 0 .02
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 33 negatives ( 67.35% ) and 3 positives (  6.12% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 10 negatives ( 32.26% ) and 2 positives (  6.45% ).











-.04 -.02 0 .02
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 22 negatives ( 44.90% ) and 6 positives ( 12.24% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 20 negatives ( 64.52% ) and 2 positives (  6.45% ).













-.04 -.02 0 .02 .04
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 26 negatives ( 53.06% ) and 3 positives (  6.12% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 16 negatives ( 51.61% ) and 1 positives (  3.23% ).











-.1 -.05 0 .05
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 30 negatives ( 61.22% ) and 4 positives (  8.16% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 16 negatives ( 51.61% ) and 1 positives (  3.23% ).












-.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 41 negatives ( 83.67% ) and 0 positives (  0.00% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 28 negatives ( 90.32% ) and 0 positives (  0.00% ).












-.05 0 .05 .1
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 26 negatives ( 53.06% ) and 7 positives ( 14.29% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 28 negatives ( 90.32% ) and 0 positives (  0.00% ).
Instruments subject: Education
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(b) Projected budget with FEs (year and ministry)
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(b) Correlation between Staff size and instruments, controlling for projected budget
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(b) Poisson regression
Dots indicate the predicted number of events for each year of tenure, while the range plot with the capped spikes shows the
corresponding 95 CI. If the year of tenure is higher than 8, it is recoded to 8. Regressions include Ministry and year fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the Ministry level. When working with FR, ministries that report a total of 3 or less
instruments during the whole period of analysis are excluded.
Table A.1 List of National Ministries and Agencies and Independent Variable Coverage 
 
中央部委名称 Name of National Ministry or Agency  Category_
abb 
Career Staffing Closing Budget 
农业部 Ministry of Agriculture A 2000-2013 2008 2007-2013 
民政部 Ministry of Civil Affairs A 2000-2013 2008 2011-2013 
商务部 Ministry of Commerce A 2000-2013 2003 2010-2013 
文化部 Ministry of Culture A 2000-2013 2008 2007-2013 
教育部 Ministry of Education A 2000-2013 2008 2007-2013 
环境保护部 Ministry of Environmental Protection A NA 2008 2007-2013 
财政部 Ministry of Finance A 2000-2013 2008 2010-2013 
外交部 Ministry of Foreign Affairs A 2000-2013 NA 2011-2012 
住房和城乡建设部 Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development A 2000-2013 2008 2010-2012 
人力资源和社会保障部 Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security A 2000-2013 2008 2008-2009 
工业和信息化部 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology A 2000-2013 2008 2010-2013 
司法部 Ministry of Justice A 2000-2013 2008 2010-2013 
国土资源部 Ministry of Land and Resources A 2000-2013 2008 2010-2013 
公安部 Ministry of Public Security A 2000-2013 NA 2013 
科学技术部 Ministry of Science and Technology A 2000-2013 2008 2007-2013 
监察部 Ministry of Supervision A 2000-2013 NA 2013 
交通运输部 Ministry of Transport A 2000-2013 2009 2011 
水利部 Ministry of Water Resources A 2000-2013 2008 2010-2013 
审计署 National Audit Office A 2000-2013 2008 2007-2013 
国家发展和改革委员会 National Development and Reform Commission A 2000-2013 2008 2011-2013 
国家卫生和计划生育委员会 National Health and Family Planning Commission A NA 2013 2011-2013 
中国人民银行 People’s Bank of China A 2000-2013 2008 2013 
国家民族事务委员会 State Ethnic Affairs Commission A NA NA 2010-2013 
国务院办公厅 General Office of the State Council A NA 2008 NA 
国防部 Ministry of National Defense A 2000-2013 NA NA 
国家安全部 Ministry of State Security A 2000-2013 NA NA 
国家食品药品监督管理总局 China Food and Drug Administration B 2000-2013 2003, 2008, 
2013 
NA 
海关总署 General Administration of Customs B 2000-2013 2008 NA 
国家质量监督检验检疫总局 General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine 
B 2001-2013 2008 2010-2013 
国家体育总局 General Administration of Sport B 2000-2013 2009 NA 
国家统计局 National Bureau of Statistics B 2000-2013 2008 NA 
国家旅游局 National Tourism Administration B 2000-2013 2008 NA 
国家工商行政管理总局 State Administration for Industry and Commerce B 2000-2013 2008 2010-2013 
国家新闻出版广电总局 State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film 
and Television 
B NA 2013 NA 
国家税务总局 State Taxation Administration B 2000-2013 2008 2010-2013 
国家安全生产监督管理总局 State Administration of Work Safety B 2000-2013 2005, 2008 NA 
国家林业局 State Forestry Administration B 2000-2013 2008 NA 
国家知识产权局 State Intellectual Property Office B 2000-2013 2008 NA 
国务院国有资产监督管理委员
会 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission 
B 2000-2013 2003 NA 
中国银行业监督管理委员会 China Banking Regulatory Commission C 2003-2013 2003 NA 
中国保险监督管理委员会 China Insurance Regulatory Commission C 2000-2013 2003 NA 
中国证券监督管理委员会 China Securities Regulatory Commission C 2000-2013 NA NA 
中国民用航空局 Civil Aviation Administration of China D 2000-2013 2009 NA 
国家测绘局 National Administration of Surveying, Mapping and 
Geoinformation 
D 2000-2013 2009 NA 
铁道部 （国家铁路局) National Railway Administration D 2000-2013 2009, 2013 NA 
国家外汇管理局 State Administration of Foreign Exchange D NA 2009 NA 
国家海洋局 State Oceanic Administration D 2000-2013 2008, 2013 NA 
国家能源局 National Energy Administration D NA 2013 NA 
国家文物局 State Administration of Cultural Heritage D NA NA NA 
国家煤矿安全监察局 State Administration of Coal Mine Safety D NA 2005, 2008 NA 
国家外国专家局 State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs D NA 2008 NA 
国家粮食局 State Administration of Grain D NA 2009 NA 
国家国防科技工业局 State Administration of Science, Technology and 
Industry for National Defense 
D NA NA NA 
国家中医药管理局 State Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine D NA 2009 NA 
国家公务员局 State Bureau of Civil Servants D NA 2008 NA 
国家信访局 State Bureau for Letters and Calls D NA 2009 NA 
国家邮政局 State Post Bureau D NA 2006, 2009 NA 
国家烟草专卖局 State Tobacco Monopoly Administration D NA 2008 NA 
 
